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ANALYZING SUBPART F IN LIGHT OF CHECK-THE-BOX
Cynthia Ram Sweitzer*
Congress enacted the Subpart F taxation antideferral regime in
1962 as a political compromise between two fundamentally opposed
viewpoints. The Kennedy Administration, on the left, sought to curb
further erosion of the United States (U.S.) tax base through a worldwide
taxation system that would tax all foreign-source income. The
Republican-led Congress and multinational business community, on the
right, sought to encourage U.S. foreign investment and corporate profit
generation through the continuance of a territorial taxation system that
taxed only domestic-source income. Subpart F compromised between
these contradictory goals by subjecting the passive income of U.S.
subsidiaries operating in foreign jurisdictions to current U.S. taxation,
but not the active income. Subpart F thus exempts legitimate business
income from current taxation. In 1997, the United States Department of
Treasury (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, Service, or
Agency) published entity classification regulations that, ironically,
favored the right by furthering the avoidance of Subpart F income.
Arguing that these regulations thus disrupt the balance of the Subpart F
compromise, the left has sought further action to neutralize their effects.
Intuitively, if Congress enacted Subpart F to curb erosion of the
U.S. tax base, it follows that Subpart F caused greater contribution to the
U.S. tax base. It also follows that if the check-the-box (CTB) regulatory
regime renders Subpart F toothless, the U.S. tax base has subsequently
shrunken. But is either of these conclusions true? First, absent the CTB
regime, was Subpart F effective, or did the compromise itself render its
policy objectives unattainable? Second, if the U.S. tax base has
* Cynthia Ram Sweitzer is an attorney with the law firm of Faggert and Frieden, P.C. in Virginia
Beach, Virginia. Ms. Sweitzer earned her LL.M. in Taxation from the Boston University School of
Law and her J.D. from the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of America. She
would like to thank especially Brainard (Skip) Patton, international tax attorney and member of the
faculty at Boston University School of Law for reviewing and encouraging submission of the article
and Jennifer Knox Jordan of The Jordan Law Firm for continual inspiration to promote skilled
writing and academia.
1
Ram Sweitzer: Anaylyzing Subpart F in Light of Check-the-Box
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
shrunken, is it resultant of CTB, or is Subpart F itself responsible for
causing a gradual depletion of the U.S. tax base? As Subpart F's forty-
year anniversary passed, an increasing number of multinationals began
reincorporating as non-U.S. corporations, thus avoiding altogether the
application of the U.S.'s semi-worldwide taxation system, and
necessarily diminishing the U.S. tax base. Corporations tout as their
reason for taking this drastic move the continually increasing
applicability and stringency of Subpart F. They do so despite the
benefits available through CTB.
This article explains the history of the Subpart F compromise and
of the CTB regime that beleaguers its application. The paper then
evaluates whether Subpart F as an independent system is capable of
affecting the policy goals behind its creation. Subsequently, this paper
analyzes what is the most prudent and economically sound course of
action for healing the U.S. international taxation system. Namely, at
issue is whether additional regulation, in the form of a re-vamped
Subpart F or a scaled-down CTB, would solve the ailments, or whether
the complete revocation of existing policies, such as the U.S. semi-
worldwide taxation system or the CTB regime, is necessary. Finally, the
paper concludes that the evolution of Subpart F has come full circle. In
light of current inversions of major U.S. multinationals into non-U.S.
multinationals, specifically to avoid the complications of Subpart F, and
of the reduction of the U.S. tax base that necessarily corresponds,
Subpart F undeniably results in some erosion of the U.S. tax base. Its
purpose for existing is thus nullified and it is time for the U.S. to return
to a policy of territorial taxation.
I. THE PAST: FORTY-YEAR ANNIVERSARY - TIME TO CELEBRATE OR
DEBATE?
Before 1962, corporate subsidiaries operating outside the United
States did so free from current U.S. taxation.' Not unless and until an
overseas subsidiary repatriated income to its U.S. parent was it subject to
2taxation other than as imposed by the foreign jurisdiction. Augmented
1. See Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right,
Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2001) ("From 1913 through the
1950s, U.S. multinational corporations operated free from current U.S. income tax to the extent that
they conducted operations through foreign subsidiaries.").
2. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1527. Some foreign-source income was subject to immediate
taxation under the Foreign Personal Holding Company (FPHC) antiavoidance regime adopted in the
1930s. See id. at 1532-33. The FPHC regime targets only certain closely held foreign subsidiaries;
the subsidiary must have five or fewer U.S. owners and derive at least sixty percent of its gross
2
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by a more international and less isolated vision toward business ventures
since the end of World War i, 3 U.S. corporations took advantage of the
U.S.'s territorial taxation system.4 Corporations moved operations
offshore, establishing subsidiaries in countries taxing income at rates
lower than U.S. corporate income tax rates, or not taxing income at all.
5
The upsurge was great enough to cause a noticeable erosion of the U.S.
tax base and prompt lawmakers to seek change.6 In 1961, the Kennedy
Administration introduced legislation groundbreaking in the field of
taxation-the worldwide income tax.7
A. The Mission: Capital Export Neutrality
Capital export neutrality is a situation under which there exists no
incentive to export capital from the U.S. to a foreign jurisdiction because
income generated overseas is taxed exactly as it would be if earned
within the U.S. Because this policy taxes income at the same rates
regardless of where it is earned, there exists no motivation to invest
abroad rather than domestically. Exportation of U.S. capital is therefore
less likely, causing greater investment in domestic business and labor.
8
If a U.S. corporation chooses to invest abroad nevertheless, it does so
with no competitive tax advantage over its solely domestic rivals.
United States taxation of foreign-source income would thus create global
tax neutrality and a level playing field between U.S. multinational
corporations and U.S. solely domestic corporations. 9
The Kennedy Administration sought to effect capital export
neutrality. Under its proposed legislation, virtually all income earned by
income from designated passive sources. See id. at 1533-34. The regime therefore reaches neither
foreign subsidiaries owned by publicly traded U.S. corporations nor those generating substantial
active income. See id
3. Cf Engel, supra note 1, at 1538 (pointing to investment in foreign subsidiaries after
World War II as a cause for U.S. deficit and diminished GNP growth not seen in other industrialized
countries).
4. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1539. Americans generally viewed investment in offshore
subsidiaries "as a favorable mechanism of promoting foreign investment." Id. at 1538.
5. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1532-33.
6. See Melvin S. Adess et al., The Erosion of Deferral After the 1993 Act, 47 TAX LAW. 933,
934-35 (1994); Engel, supra note 1, at 1525, 1539. Americans shifted to generally view investment
in offshore subsidiaries "as a malignant mechanism to avoid worldwide tax." Engel, supra note 1,
at 1538.
7. S. REP. No. 87-1881 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3297.
8. See, e.g., President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means on the Recommendations of the President Contained in his Message
Transmitted to the Congress, 87th Cong. 404, 2595, 3248 (April 20, 1961) [hereinafter 1961 House
Hearings] (memorializing labor groups' support for Kennedy's plan).
9. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1527.
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a U.S. corporation's foreign subsidiaries would trigger current U.S.
income tax liabilities to domestic shareholders.10 Foreign-based income
would thus be taxed as if generated at home, increasing the federal tax
base and eliminating the competitive advantage of subsidiaries operating
in tax haven nations over those operating solely in the U.S. 1 Taxing
income worldwide remains a revolutionary concept forty years after the
Kennedy Administration first proposed it; only a few nations exercise
some form of worldwide taxation today. Political adversaries arguing as
proponents of capital import neutrality opposed the Kennedy proposal
adamantly. 12
B. The Opposition: Capital Import Neutrality
Capital import neutrality is a circumstance whereby domestic
capital investments receive no tax preference over imported capital
investments because the government taxes the income generated by both
equally. Because income is taxed at the same rates regardless of where
the taxpayer or its shareholders reside, there is no deterrent to investing
abroad. U.S. taxpayers can take advantage of global business
opportunities and the benefits of foreign markets without penalization by
uncompetitive taxation. If a U.S. corporation establishes a subsidiary
overseas, only the foreign jurisdiction taxes its income, rather than the
corporation being subject to taxation by the U.S. (at higher rates) as
well. United States taxation of only domestic-source income thus fosters
international competitiveness and creates a level playing field between
U.S. foreign subsidiaries and their locally owned foreign rivals.13
The Kennedy proposal would have killed capital import neutrality.
Subsidiaries already operating in tax haven jurisdictions without current
U.S. tax liability were facing drastic consequences if the proposed
legislation became law. Such companies would pay taxes at the same
corporate income rate as domestic U.S. corporations (capital export, or
global tax, neutrality), but at a global rate higher than that imposed on
their local foreign competitors (capital import, or international
competitiveness, non-neutrality). Such companies would, Congressional
Republicans argued, lose their ability to compete in the face of
10. See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 8-10, 30, 31, 263, 264. See also Adess, supra
note 6, at 934 (referring to "the Kennedy Administration's proposal to eliminate all deferral for
foreign corporations controlled by U.S. persons") (emphasis added).
11. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1527 (noting that wholly domestic enterprises would thus
remain competitive with their U.S. multinational rivals).
12. See 1961 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 309-27, 330, 331.
13. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1527, 1539-41.
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decreasing profits, and ultimately lose their businesses. 14
The political battle thus pitted global tax neutrality against
international competitiveness, and both sides ultimately lost out.
Although Kennedy's proposal did not pass, Democrats were resolute on
change and Republicans soon compromised.
C. The Compromise: Subpart F
In 1962, Congress enacted, and President Kennedy signed into law,
sections 951 through 964 of the Internal Revenue Code. 15  Commonly
known as Subpart F, 16 this legislative regime seeks to prevent the
deferral of U.S. income tax liability in limited circumstances. Deferral
of taxes on foreign subsidiary income 17 is permitted for legitimate, active
business endeavors. 18  No deferral is permitted, however, for passive,
inherently mobile, foreign corporate operations, such as those producing
only royalty, interest, or dividend income.' 9 Because such activities are
14. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1531, 1540.
15. See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified at 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.)
§§ 951-964 (1999)).
16. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1999). See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 69.1, at 69-2 (2001) ("The provisions are subpart
F of part III of subehapter N of Chapter 1 of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code."). See
generally Adess, supra note 6 (speaking to the history of "Subpart F"); Henry J. Birnkrant & James
E. Croker, Jr., Hybrid Regs. Raise Issues About Subpart F, Treasury's Regulatory Authority, and
Check-the-Box, 89 J. TAX'N 45 (1998) (analyzing Treasury and the IRS's attempts to establish new
"Subpart F" regulations).
17. Subpart F applies solely to the corporate form. See Adess, supra note 6, at 934-35. The
U.S. has the power to tax U.S. people on their foreign income, see Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56
(1924), but lacks the power to tax foreign corporations, owned by U.S. people, on their income. See
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND
FOREIGN INCOME 26.1.1 (2d ed. 1998). Taxation on such income is thus deferred until the income
is repatriated to the U.S. Subpart F works to curb enjoyment of this situation by deeming certain
foreign subsidiary (controlled foreign corporation (CFC)) income as repatriated as it is earned. The
U.S. shareholders of such a foreign entity (versus the subsidiary itself) are thus taxed currently on
income not actually repatriated, but merely deemed repatriated by Subpart F.
18. See H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture on [sic] International Tax
Arbitrage and the "International Tax System, " 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 157-58. A foreign subsidiary
operating in purchase, sale, and service activities within its foreign jurisdiction satisfies this
requirement automatically, as does a subsidiary engrossed in manufacturing activities. Deferral due
to legitimate business purpose is permitted in two additional circumstances. Id. First, service
operations requiring foreign incorporation garner deferral treatment, provided the foreign subsidiary
does not receive substantial related-party assistance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-4(b) (2004). Second,
licensing endeavors justifying foreign incorporation receive deferral treatment if the foreign
subsidiary operates an active business enterprise. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(d) (2004).
19. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (referring to passive investments as
"foreign personal holding company income"); Rosenbloom, supra note 18, at 158. Deferral of
otherwise passive income is permitted under three circumstances. First, passive income will be U.S.
tax deferred if the taxpayer demonstrates that it is subject to sufficient taxation by the foreign
2005] SUBPART F
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executable within the U.S., Subpart F presumes they are conducted
offshore solely for tax avoidance purposes.20 Thus, rather than taxing all
foreign-source income as a capital export-neutral system would do,
Subpart F purports to tax only income generated outside the U.S. with
the particular intent of avoiding U.S. taxation. Similarly, rather than
deferring all income generated in foreign jurisdictions, as would a
capital import-neutral system, Subpart F theoretically defers only
income earned through enterprises conducting legitimate business
activities.
The system does not function as easily, however, as this
explanation of its purpose may suggest. Wriggled with numerous
revisions, additions, and exceptions, Subpart F is the most extensive and
complicated of the international antideferral regimes.21 Subpart F
income consists of insurance and foreign base company income
(FBCI).22 Foreign base company income consists of five separate types
of income, three of which arise often.23 The first of these five, foreign
personal holding company income,24 taxes currently foreign source
income in the form of dividends, interest, rents, royalties, annuities, and
property sales resulting in one of these income types.25  The second
26iso taeFBCI is foreign base company sales income. This provision taxes
jurisdiction. See Rosenbloom, supra note 18, at 158. This policy presumes that if the foreign
subsidiary is willing to pay high-rate foreign taxes, that it must have a genuine non-tax, business
purpose for operating in the foreign jurisdiction. Id.
Second, passive foreign-source income will be U.S. tax deferred if the income is earned by
a CFC incorporated in the same country as is the payor of the income, provided the income payment
does not reduce the amount of income otherwise currently taxable by the U.S. Id. See also I.R.C. §
954(c)(3). This policy means that it does not matter whether a foreign jurisdiction levies its
territorial taxes upon two entities or upon one; U.S. tax treatment should likewise not be altered.
See Rosenbloom, supra note 18.
Third, active businesses that generate passive-type income inherently, such as banking
income, garner deferral treatment under certain circumstances. See I.R.C. § 954 (h), (i) (1999).
20. See Rosenbloom, supra note 18, at 158.
21. See Howard Gleckrnan, Taxing Multinationals: The Donnybrook Ahead, BUS. WK., Sept.
9, 2002, at 86 (noting "the way the U.S. taxes exporters and multinationals [as] especially ugly,"
imposing "reams of incomprehensible rules" forcing corporations to "spend a small fortune on
lawyers and accountants"); US. Should Respond to WTO with Territorial Tax, Says CFP, Tax-
News.com, New York, (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/storyprint.
asp?storyname=7060 (last visited 1/23/2005) (defining the U.S.'s semi-worldwide tax laws as
extremely complex and paperwork burdensome) [hereinafter U.S. Should Respond]. See also
Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 836
(2000) (touting a territorial taxation system as simpler and cheaper than the current U.S. system).
22. I.R.C. § 952 (2004).
23. I.R.C. § 954 (2004).
24. I.R.C. § 954(c) (2004).
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 954(d)(1) (2004).
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foreign source income earned when a foreign subsidiary purchases
goods from outside its country of incorporation, sells the goods outside
such country, and either the corporation it purchased from or sold to is
related.27 A third FBCI is foreign base company services income.28 This
income is generated when a foreign subsidiary performs services outside
its country of incorporation either for, or on behalf of, a related party.29
This brief explanation may still illuminate Subpart F in a
comprehendable, if not sensible, light. Added to these provisions,
however, are abounding exceptions, definitions, rules of applicability,
and regulations, making the provisions difficult to navigate. Congress
has amended and added to the regime several times since its inception,
slowly decreasing the ability of U.S. multinational corporations to defer
income earned offshore.30 Subpart F remains in effect today as an
extensive and complicated antideferral regime. 31 This regime is largely,
if not entirely, circumventable, however, since the establishment of the
new entity classification regulations in 1997.
D. The Demise.: Check-the-Box
1. Treasury and the IRS Mastermind Their Own Method
In 1997, the Treasury and the IRS 32 effected regulations permitting
non-per se corporations to choose their tax treatment.33 The regulations
are known as the check-the-box 34 classification regime because an entity
27. Id.
28. I.R.C. § 954(e) (2004).
29. LR.C. § 954(e)(1) (2004).
30. See generally Adess, supra note 6, for a comprehensive view of the history of Subpart F
up to its 1993 amendments, and BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 16, for a detailed explanation of
Subpart F in its entirety.
31. See U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21; Chorvat, supra note 21, at 836 (touting a
territorial taxation system as simpler and cheaper than a worldwide system).
32. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,587 (Dec. 18, 1996) (effective Jan.
1, 1997). The regulations provide guidance for the Internal Revenue Code entity classification rules
set out at I.R.C. § 7701 (2001). See id
33. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (c)(l)(iv) (as amended in 1999). See Roger F. Pillow &
John J. Rooney, Check-the-Box: Final Conversion Regs. Add Clarification While New Prop. Regs.
Add Some Uncertainty, 92 J. TAX'N 197, 197 (2000) (noting that an eligible entity may elect its
classification for federal income tax purposes).
34. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 64 Fed. Reg. 66591 (Nov. 29, 1999)
(referring to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 as "the check-the-box" regulations).
35. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended in 1992) (current version at Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-1 through -4 (as amended in 1999)) (applying Jan. 1, 1961 through Jun. 30, 1996). Prior
SUBPART F2005]
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characterization choice for federal taxation purposes.36 The CTB
regulations classify a foreign business entity37 as a corporation, 38 a
partnership,39  or as disregarded.40  Specific foreign entities are
to the check-the-box (CTB) regime, business entities had to meet a test to garner classification as a
pass-through entity. See id The test evaluated whether a business entity embodied corporate
characteristics too extensively to permit taxation as a partnership. See John Blyth et al.,
Characteristics of Corporate Status for Federal Income Tax Purposes, in 16 N.Y. JUR. BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS § 2009 (2d ed., 2003).
The IRS considered whether an entity enjoyed limited liability, provided for the continuity
of its life, allowed for the free transferability of its interests, or possessed a centralized management.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), (b), (c), (e) (as amended in 1992) (current version at Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-1 through -4); Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501 at §§ 4, 5.01 - 5.04; Rev. Proc. 89-12,
1989-1 C.B. 798, at §§ 4, 4.05 -4.07.
An entity exhibiting two or fewer of these corporation-like characteristics would pass the
test and be considered a partnership for U.S. federal taxation purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(g) (as amended in 1992) (current version at Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 through -4) (providing
several examples). If the entity was deemed to possess greater than two of the characteristics,
however, it would suffer double taxation as a corporation. See § 301.7701-2(g) (as amended in
1992) (current version at Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 through -4); Blyth, supra note 35. The test was
widely criticized because meeting it was extremely difficult and resource intensive. See, e.g., Rev.
Proc. 95-10, at § 3; Blyth, supra note 35 ("The information to be submitted with a ruling request is
lengthy and detailed.").
36. See IRS Form 8832, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf (in
downloadable, "Adobe Acrobat Document" form), alternatively available at http://www.irs.gov
("Forms and Publications Finder," search, "Form 8832" for downloadable form).
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), -3(a), -3(b)(2) (as amended in 1999) (clarifying subsection -
3(a) that classification as an "association" equals classification as a corporation). Domestic
business entities are classified under the same three titles. Id. at § 301.7701-2(a), -3(a), -3(b)(1).
38. A corporation enjoys limited liability but its income is taxed doubly, at both the corporate
and shareholder levels.
39. Some partnership partner(s) suffers personal liability, but partnership income is taxed
singly at the partner level.
40. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(4), -2(a) (as amended in 1999); Michael Hirschfeld &
Richard Wild, Check-the-Box Knows No Boundaries (at Least, For the Moment), 482 PRAC. L.
INST./TAX 1317, 1322 (2000). A disregarded entity is, for tax purposes, a partnership having but
one partner, or rather one owner. See id Its activities are treated the same as are those of its
corporate parent; the entity's income and losses are considered income and losses of its parent
owner. See id. It is thus "disregarded" because its activities do not bear consequences upon it as a
separate entity. See id at 1325. Because it is ignored for U.S. income tax purposes, payments made
between a disregarded entity and its owner are not recognized. See Bimkrant & Croker, supra note
16, at 45-46; Pat Grube, Putting Tiered Entities Into a Foreign Holding Company Structure Using
Check-the-Box, 94 J. TAX'N 5 (2001).
"Disregarded entities" are also referred to as "tax nothings." See, e.g., Joel Rabinovitz &
Eric M. Zolt, Tax Nothings, TAXES, Dec. 1997, at 869, 871; Lee A. Sheppard, Putting Checks on the
Check-the-Box Rules, 85 TAX NOTES 1353, 1354 (1999) [hereinafter Sheppard I] (satirizing, as the
creator of the catchword, that disregarded entities are 'widely known' as tax nothings).
Additionally, they are known as "hybrids." See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433, II;
BirTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 16, at 69.13.1, at 69-79 (defining a hybrid as an entity
disregarded for U.S. tax purposes but treated as a corporation for the foreign country's tax
purposes). Disregarded entities are referred to also as "branches." See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1999) ("if [an] entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the
8
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designated as per se corporations and their classification as such cannot
be changed.41 Otherwise, a foreign entity defaults into a classification
based upon whether it has one or more than one owner, and upon
whether at least one of its owners has liability that is not limited.42
Presuming that the foreign entity wishes to operate without personal
liability, it defaults into corporate status.43 Alternatively, an entity may
file an election, or "check the box," to opt out of the applicable default
classification.44 In order to enjoy the duality of limited liability and
preferential tax treatment, therefore, the foreign entity files an election to
opt out of corporate status, or stated more correctly, to opt into
partnership or disregarded status (for tax purposes only).45 The benefits
reapable through classification as a foreign disregarded entity extend,
however, far beyond partnership-like preferential tax treatment.46
The CTB regime has paved the way for creative tax avoidance
planning options. For example, often a U.S. corporation sets up a
holding company in a (typically tax favorable) foreign country in which
it conducts business. This holding company may in turn set up (or
same manner as a ... branch ... ).
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (as amended in 1999). Cf Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(b)(1), (3)-(7) (as amended in 1999). Domestically, the CTB regulations designate corporations
organized under state laws or certain federal statutes as per se corporations. Id.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (as amended in 1999); Hirschfeld & Wild, supra note
40, at 1345-49 (outlining application of the check-the-box (CTB) rules internationally).
If a foreign business entity is not a per se corporation and has only one owner, then it is
classified, by default, as disregarded if the owner's liability is not limited (i.e., if the owner is
personally liable), Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(i)(C) (as amended in 1999), and as a corporation
if the owner's liability is limited, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (b)(2)(i)(B) (as amended in 1999)
(instructing that the regulations' classification of an entity having one owner with limited liability as
an "association" is synonymous with classification as a corporation). See also Hirschfeld & Wild,
supra note 40, at 1346. Cf Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (b)(l). Domestically, an entity that is not a
corporation (per se or otherwise) and has only one owner is a disregarded entity by default. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1). Because liability is not considered in the domestic default classifications, a
domestic check-the-box election is made only to opt into corporate status. Hirschfeld & Wild,
supra note 40, at 1322-23.
If such an entity has more than one owner, then it is classified, by default, as a partnership
if at least one owner's liability is not limited, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(i)(A) (as amended in
1999), and as a corporation if all owners enjoy limited liability, Treas. Reg. § 301.77 0 1-3(a),
(b)(2)(i)(B) (as amended in 1999). See Hirschfeld & Wild, supra note 40, at 1322-23.
43. See id
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1999).
45. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1999). A foreign entity having one
owner (the domestic parent) free of personal liability may elect to be treated not as a corporation,
but rather as disregarded for U.S. taxation purposes. See id. Such classification holds for U.S. tax
purposes only; the entity designated as disregarded for U.S. tax purposes remains a corporation
under its host country's laws. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 16, 69.13.1, at 69-79.
46. See, e.g., Grube, supra note 40 (explaining how to implement the CTB regime to
circumvent the taxable income generated through the Subpart F regime).
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purchase a controlling share of stock of) one or more operating
companies in alternative foreign countries. As such, any interest,
royalty, or dividend income that an operating company pays to the
holding company will constitute Subpart F income to the holding
company.47 Such income creates a current tax liability to the holding
company's U.S. shareholders (i.e., to the U.S. corporation).48
Alternatively, because of the CTB regulations, the operating companies
may be treated as disregarded for U.S. tax purposes. As such, any
monies paid by them to the holding company would not constitute
Subpart F income, but merely pass through as though earned directly by
the holding company.49 Use of the disregarded classification on U.S.
foreign subsidiaries thus thwarts application of Subpart F. Its use
internationally therefore draws a divided response. While practitioners
and corporations implementing the system see it as revolutionizing
global business and opening doors, scholars of the Subpart F regime and
its intended goals tout CTB as an action of Treasury and the IRS made
without aforethought or appreciation for its inevitable reverberations.5 °
The IRS states that U.S. multinational corporations have been derelict in
implementing CTB to avoid Subpart F income.51 Notable, however, are
the facts that the CTB regime is an IRS creation, and that the IRS
promulgated CTB without soliciting any advice or opinions from
Congress or practitioners.
2. Treasury and the IRS Seek to Slay Their Own System
Treasury and the IRS have attempted continually since 1997 to
revoke the CTB regime through regulations. In 1998, they published
temporary 52 and proposed53 regulations intended to neutralize CTB tax
planning benefits.54 Under these regulations, the conversion of a foreign
47. I.R.C. § 954(c) (2004).
48. I.R.C. § 951(a)(2004).
49. See I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433 (noting a similar example as a planning option
disfavored by the IRS); Hirschfeld & Wild, supra note 40, at 1350.
50. See, e.g., Sheppard I, supra note 40, at 1353 (submitting that Treasury had long been
warned "that extending the check-the-box privilege to foreign entities was a really dumb idea")
(emphasis added). Cf Engel, supra note 1, at 1528 (highlighting that CTB is a system the merits of
which are overwhelmingly regaled on the domestic front).
51. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 1, at 1528.
52. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.904-5T, 1.954-IT, -2T, -9T, 301.7701-3T (1995).
53. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.702-1, 1.952-1, 1.954-1 through -4, -9, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,669 (Mar.
26, 1998).
54. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.904-5T, 1.954-IT, -2T, -9T, 301.7701-3T (1998); Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.702-1, 1.952-1, 1,954-1 through -4, -9, 63 Fed. Reg. at 14,671-73 (demonstrating
the regulations' function as neutralizing international CTB). Treasury and the IRS issued the
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entity's taxation classification would be ignored. More accurately, a
corporation would be limited in its ability to elect to convert its foreign
entity from one classification to another.55 Thus, the designation of a
foreign entity as disregarded would be revoked under the proposed
regulations, causing any interest, dividend and royalty income realized
by the entity to be treated as Subpart F income to U.S. shareholders.
These conversion regulations 56 would have, as regards international
operations, converted the CTB system into a nullity.57 In response to
what became a highly political outcry,58 however, the proposed
conversion regulations were withdrawn. 9 The IRS insisted, however,
temporary and proposed regulations concurrently with IRS Notice 98-11. I.R.S. Notice 98-11,
1998-1 C.B. 433. Rather than merely alerting practitioners and businessmen to the IRS's position
on such transactions, Notice 98-11 was implemented immediately via the temporary regulations.
See Treasury Caves on Foreign Hybrid Regs.-For the Moment, Anyway, 89 J. TAX'N 3 (Jul. 1998).
But see Albertina M. Fernandez, IRS's Danilack Defends Notice 98-11, 98 TAX NOTES 97-5 (1998)
(denying that the conversion regulations indicate Treasury and the IRS's intention to repeal the CTB
regime).
55. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.904-5T, 1.954-iT, -2T, -9T, 301.7701-3T (1995); Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.702-1, 1.952-1, 1.954-1 through -4, -9, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,669 (Mar. 26, 1998). See
also I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433.
56. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,591 (Nov. 29, 1999)
(dubbing as "the conversion regulations" the proposed and final regulations under section 7701
dedicated to redefining the tax consequences of changes in entity classification).
57. Hirschfeld & Wild, supra note 40, at 1354.
58. See Treasury Caves on Foreign Hybrid Regs.-For the Moment, Anyway, supra note 55
(speaking to Treasury/IRS negotiations with Congress); Service Puts Six-Year Moratorium on
Foreign H.biA pegs. 01 1 TAx'N 67 (Aug. 0Q)( tnirca ting Ji1 9, 1990 newlv-nronsed
regulations to be the result of political pressure). See, e.g., Rep. Amo Houghton, et al., W&MLetter
to Rubin on IRS Authority in International Tax Areas, 98 TAx NOTES 80-73 (1998) (reprinting a
letter to Treasury Secretary Rubin recommending withdrawal of the conversion regulations, signed
by 32 members of the House Ways and Means Committee); Bill Archer & Charles Rangel, Letter to
Treasury Secretary Rubin from Reps. Archer and Rangel Regarding Regulations on Hybrid
Arrangements, available at WL 1998 56 DER L-1 (Mar. 24, 1998); Sens. Connie Mack & John B.
Breaux, MacklBreaux Letter to Paull on Notice 98-11, 98 TAX NOTES 81-27 (1998).
See also Paul Cherecwich, Jr. & Tax Executives Institute Inc., TEl Calls Hybrid
Arrangements Notice 'Poor Tax Policy' 98 TAX NOTES 54-34 (1998) (reprinting a letter from the
Tax Executives Institute to Associate Chief Counsel Michael Danilack); Thomas J. Usher, Business
Group Reiterates Opposition to Tax Treatment of Hybrid Entities, 98 TAX NOTES 103-20 (1998)
(reprinting a letter from The Business Roundtable to Secretary of the Treasury Rubin); Arthur
Andersen LLP & O'Brien-Calio, Hybrid Branch Coalition Letter to W&M and Finance Leaders, 98
TAX NOTES 132-19 (1998); Mark McConaghy & Bernard M. Shapiro, Price Waterhouse Letter
Asking Taxwriters to Address Notice 98-11 Concerns, 98 TAX NOTES 117-31(1998).
59. See I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34 (announcing Jul. 6, 1998 that Notice 98-11, and
both the temporary and proposed conversion regulations, would be withdrawn). Notice 98-35, in
addition to effectively withdrawing the conversion regulations, defined its own "transition rules."
Id. In the Notice the IRS also promised to propose regulations on the check-the-box election matter
again in the future. Id.
Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.904-5, 1.952, 1.54-1, -2, -9, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,727 (Jul. 13, 1999),
published Jul. 13, 1999 technically withdrew the proposed regulations, id. at 37,729, and T.D. 8827,
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that the regulations were not killed, but merely postponed.6° In 1999, the
Agency therefore published new proposed regulations, 61 but set them to
take effect so distant in the future 62 that IRS challenges based on them
were rendered unlikely for many years.63
II. THE PRESENT: MID-LIFE CRISIS - IS SUBPART F A SELF-PRESAGED
FAILURE?
In addition to the fact that taxpayers use the CTB regime to
circumvent antideferral, practitioners and congressmen speculate that
Subpart F on its own does not bring about its desired results.64 But what
are the regime's desired results? The capital export neutrality advocate
may state that policy objective as the goal behind Subpart F.65 A capital
import neutrality advocate, on the other hand, may state its policy goal
as Subpart F's desired result. Because Subpart F is a compromise,
however, neither spectrumal policy agenda can be its goal; compromise
64 Fed. Reg. 37,677 (Jul. 13, 1999), published the same day, actually removed the temporary
regulations. Id.
60. I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34.
61. Prop. Treas.Reg. §§ 1.904-5, 1.952, 1.54-1, -2, -9, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,727 (Jul. 13, 1999).
The proposed regulations withdrew I.R.S. Notice 98-35, basically restated the previous temporary
and proposed conversion regulations, and set an at-least-six-year moratorium on their own
effectiveness. See id.
62. See id. The newly-proposed conversion regulations guarantee a moratorium of at least six
years. See id Because the regulations, published in July 1999, were written to take effect no
sooner than five years from their (earliest) July 1, 2000 finalization date, the regulations cannot take
effect before July 1, 2005. See id Congress was likely to impose a moratorium on the regulations
had the IRS not done so itself. See David Benson & Margaret O'Connor, Treasury's Retreat on
Hybrid Branches, 84 TAX NOTES 769, 771 (1998); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 122-28 (1998)
(proposing a six-month moratorium on the Agency's original conversion regulations).
63. See Hirschfeld & Wild, supra note 40, at 1354; Treasury Caves on Foreign Hybrid Regs.-
For the Moment, Anyway, supra note 55. But see Harvey & Klein, et al., Treasury and the IRS
Unveil Ambitious Business Plan for 2001, 3 BUS. ENTITIES 55 (Jul.-Aug. 2001). Treasury and the
IRS list as a priority project for completion by June 30, 2002, "[flinal regulations amending the
check-the-box regulations under Section 7701." See id. (listing "[g]uidance concerning certain
extraordinary transactions involving disregarded entities" as a separate project).
64. See, e.g., Chorvat, supra note 21, at 842-44. See also Robert J. Peroni, Back to the
Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 975 (1997) [hereinafter Peroni I]. In 1997, before establishment of the check-the-box regime,
many Congressional and business leaders argued that the antideferral regimes were hindering
international competition and contributing to the U.S. trade deficit. Id. at 976. Cf. Engel, supra
note 1, at 1538-39. In 1961, before enactment of the Subpart F antideferral regime, many political
leaders asserted that investments in foreign subsidiaries were impeding domestic growth and
causing a budget deficit. Id.
65. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Deferral: Consider Ending It, Instead of Expanding
It, 86 TAx NOTES 837, 837-38 (2000).
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is its goal.66 The important questions therefore become whether the
Subpart F compromise creates policy more injurious than either the
capital export or the capital import neutrality policies, and whether the
compromise is economically justified.
A. Economic Justification - Efficiency
The primary focus behind any economic analysis of a taxation
system is the system's efficiency consequences. Efficiency in this
context concerns the enhancing of worldwide economic efficiency, or
the increasing of worldwide income.67 Because this paper examines the
U.S.-specific Subpart F regime, however, its economic analysis
necessarily focuses on the policy issue of efficient U.S. corporate capital
allocation.
1. Efficiency Harmed Equally by Subpart F as By Capital Import
Neutrality
The typical argument against the U.S. pre-1962 territorial tax
system is that it caused capital flight; U.S. corporations exported their
capital investments to lower tax rate jurisdictions. 68 Domestic opponents
disfavor capital flight because they believe it depletes the amount of
capital resources reinvested into U.S. corporations and results in an
inefficient allocation of capital resources. 69 Additionally, they proffer
that tax-driven capital flight causes a depletion of the U.S. tax base. The
depletion of the tax base before 1962 seeingly suppo-rts tis latter
belief. Economic studies suggest, however, that a territorial system
would glean economic results equal to those garnered by the Subpart F
regime. When taxation deferral exists in some form (as active income
66. That is to say, the policy objectives of capital export neutrality and of capital import
neutrality are necessarily rendered unattainable by the Subpart F compromise. The best the left
could hope for in supporting Subpart F was greater contribution to the U.S. tax base; to hope for
greater would have been folly, to hope for less would have rendered Democratic support of the
regime senseless. The right sought merely to stave off complete worldwide taxation as much as
possible.
67. Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 87 TAX NOTES 255,
256 (2000) [hereinafter Altshuler I]; Chorvat, supra note 21, at 837-38.
68. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 1, at 1538-41. But see Chorvat, supra note 21, at 845 ("[A
territorial] system will not cause a flight of investment away from the United States.") (emphasis
added).
69. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 842-45. Capital flight contributes to less capital
repatriation, and hence less reinvestment, not merely because capital exists outside the U.S., but
because capital is retained outside the U.S. in avoidance of repatriation of taxes. See id. at 844-45.
Basing capital allocation decisions solely on taxation is inefficient. See id. at 837-38.
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deferral is currently permitted under Subpart F), the amount of capital
retained in foreign subsidiaries, rather than repatriated to the U.S. parent
for reinvestment, is equal regardless of the national tax system
implemented.73 The fact that Subpart F income is taxed currently to U.S.
shareholders does not mean such income is repatriated. Capital
allocation under a territorial system would be equally inefficient to
capital allocation under the current system. Moreover, what prevents
U.S. multinationals from reinvesting into their U.S. operations is
uniform whether a territorial or the Subpart F system is in place.
Because capital repatriated to the U.S. parent results in an immediate tax
liability, corporations save money by instead maintaining the capital
offshore.71
2. Subpart F Not Economically Justified (because resource-
intensive)
Given that the two systems are equally detrimental to U.S.
reinvestment and the U.S. tax base,72 the political-right reasons that we
might as well rid ourselves of the encumbrancing Subpart F. 73 The U.S.
would ultimately recognize greater income from savings on Subpart F
maintenance and compliance expenditures.74 The middle, however,
argues that given the equal economic results, we might as well preserve
Subpart F because its antideferral provisions provide at least some
70. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 843-45 (employing several economists' and tax policy
analysts' empirical research and findings). Economic illustrations suggest additionally that a
worldwide taxation system, without deferral, would also see economic results equal to those of the
Subpart F regime. See id. at 844.
71. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 843-45; Gleckman, supra note 21, at 88 (noting that half of
U.S. companies' foreign earnings are repatriated each year); Kurt Ritterpusch, Tax Laws Hurt U.S.
Workers Overseas, Contribute to Trade Deficit, Speakers Say, DAILY TAX REP., May 5, 2004, at G-
5 (stressing that it is U.S. tax policy that causes much multinationally-earned funds to remain
offshore rather in the hands of U.S. workers). See generally Rosanne Altshuler et al., Do
Repatriation Taxes Matter? Evidence from the Tax Returns of U.S. Multinationals, in THE EFFECTS
OF TAXATION ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 253 (Feldstein et al., eds., 1995).
72. The Subpart F system, absent CTB, would garner nominal income from the passive
income it reaches. The anti-territorial arguments stem, however, from the premise that less capital
flight occurs in a non-territorial system (resulting in a great increase in tax revenue). Because
economic studies show this basic premise to be false, the author considers the two systems' effects
on the tax base as "equal" for her purposes, despite the nominal difference that would be caused by
the passive income taxation.
73. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 87 (quoting economist Rosanne Altshuler as saying,
"We've created a huge amount of complexity, and we collect very little revenue.").
74. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 837, 845 ("[A]dopting an actual [territorial] system would
be more efficient than the current U.S. system.") (emphasis added); Gleckman, supra note 2 1, at 89;
Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REv. 261 (2001).
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nominal increase in the U.S. tax base.75 This line of reasoning is
circular, however, given that any income subject to current taxation
under Subpart F necessarily is not maintained offshore inefficiently.
76
The amount of income held offshore, in avoidance of repatriation
taxation, should be less under the Subpart F system than it would be
under a territorial system. Yet, economic analysis concludes that capital
allocation to foreign subsidiaries is equally inefficient under both
systems. 77  What does this suggest? That non-tax, business economic
reasons to invest and operate internationally exceed purely tax economic
incentives not to. Economic analysis thus seemingly favors territoriality
as the most efficient taxation system. Subpart F loses because its
convoluted structure of subject income, exceptions, limitations, and
rulings make it prohibitively cost-intensive. 78
The political-left contends, however, that if economic data find
Subpart F and territoriality to result in the same detrimental incentive to
hold capital offshore, economic data support establishment of a
worldwide taxation system. A worldwide, complete antideferral, system
curbs all tax-driven incentive to maintain income in foreign subsidiaries.
Corporations therefore allocate capital to its most efficient use, including
reinvestment in the U.S.-based parent corporation. 79  The author has
found to date, however, no economic studies mentioned that suggest the
economic superiority of a worldwide taxation system.80 Additionally,
the same analysts concluding the equality of Subpart F with a territorial
system, as to capital retention offshore, suggest further that territoriality
75. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 86 (finding that the U.S. Treasury collects as little as $5
billion a year from its international tax regime).
76. Subpart F deems subject income repatriated currently, creating an immediate tax liability.
A territorial system permits the corporation to repatriate income when it chooses to do so; only
physical income payment to the U.S. parent constitutes repatriation and creates a tax liability. The
incentive to hold income offshore, in avoidance of repatriation taxation, therefore exists only under
the territorial system. If a corporation chooses nonetheless to maintain offshore, income that has
incurred current tax liability under Subpart F, it does so for non-tax, and therefore presumably
efficient, reasons.
77. Keep in mind that the economic data analyze Subpart F absent the CTB regulations'
effects on it. Given CTB, the left would again lose on its 'U.S. tax base' argument.
78. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 88. "Companies are diverted from the business of selling
products and instead focus time and money on cutting taxes... [with] the nation's 500 biggest
companies spend[ing] more than $1 billion a year complying with the tax laws.., perhaps half of
[which] cost is linked to international tax rules." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Altshuler I, supra note 68, at 8.
80. See Fleming, supra note 66, at 25-66, for acknowledgment by pro-worldwideist tax
practitioners that they base their contentions solely on tax theory, and not on economic data or
findings. Compare Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on
Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REv. 455 (1999) [hereinafter Peroni II], which mentions
economic studies in its discussion of anti-deferral.
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is the superior economic choice in a taxation system. 81
B. Policy Creation - Competition
The primary focus of the policy analysis on Subpart F must be its
effects on competitiveness, or on the maximization of U.S. (corporate)
income.82 Because it is neither a purely worldwide nor a purely
territorial taxation system, Subpart F necessarily accomplishes neither of
the competitiveness goals of capital export 83  or capital import
84
neutrality. What, then, are the effects on competition of the semi-
worldwide, semi-territorial, Subpart F regime? The evaluation flows
from the previous efficiency analysis.
1. U.S. Competitiveness Injured More Greatly by Subpart F than
by Capital Import Neutrality
a. The Worldwide System
Presuppose a situation where the only two countries in the world, X
and Y, implement worldwide taxation systems. Country X taxes its
corporations (or their shareholders) on their (or their subsidiaries')
income earned both in country X and in country Y. Country X does not
tax income generated within its borders by country Y corporations at all.
Country Y's tax system mirrors country X's. Theorize further that
country Y's corporate income tax rate is lower than country X's tax rate.
If a country X corporation invests its capital in country Y, it receives no
tax benefit in doing so because its income is taxed at country X's
81. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 844-57; U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21.
82. See supra § I. The policy goals at issue in creating the Subpart F compromise were
capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality. See supra. The primary focus of these
policies is competition; a desire for increased competitiveness between multinational and solely
domestic U.S. corporations is pitted against a desire for increased competitiveness between U.S.
multinationals and their local foreign rivals. See supra. A secondary focus of the policies is the
efficient allocation of corporate capital. See id. The effects of Subpart F on this policy issue are
analyzed in conjunction with an analysis of economic results of Subpart F. See supra § ILA. See
also Chorvat, supra note 21, at 837 (noting that competition-oriented policies are necessarily
nationalistic).
83. U.S. corporations are not prevented completely from making investment decisions based
on international tax rates because active foreign-source income is not taxed currently by the U.S.
International tax competition, or tax arbitrage, therefore exists to some extent, and the goals of
capital export neutrality are not achieved.
84. Similarly, U.S. multinationals are prevented from enjoying free tax competition because
their passive foreign-source income is taxed currently by the U.S. International tax competition is
therefore curbed and the goals of capital import neutrality are not met.
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(higher) tax rate regardless of where it is earned. Regardless of whether,
and to what extent, the corporate tax rates of the two states differ, the
rates do not cause inefficient capital allocation. The states enjoy capital
export neutrality and worldwide income is maximized.
The policy has a drastically different effect, however, on the
countries' individual national welfares. Because their country taxes
income at a higher rate (than does country Y), country X corporations
realize lower after-tax capital returns on investment than do country Y
corporations. Country X corporate residents therefore have less income
to reinvest, and hence lower savings, than their country-Y business
rivals. Because country X does not tax any of the income generated
within its borders by country Y corporations, this imbalance does not
even out. Country X's comparatively high tax rate weakens its
corporations and destroys their ability to compete with country Y
corporations. Country X's economic welfare as a whole is
disadvantaged and its international competitiveness necessarily
destroyed. The worldwide taxation system is thus domestically injurious
because it does not respect capital import neutrality.
b. The Territorial System
Presume a second situation where the two countries, X and Y,
employ territorial taxation systems. Country X taxes its corporations
solely on their income earned within country X (and not on their income
earned within country Y). Country X also taxes income generated
within its borders by country Y corporations. Country Y's tax system
mirrors country X's. Hypothesize further that country Y's corporate
income tax rate is lower than country X's tax rate. A country X
corporation has an incentive to invest its capital in country Y because
income generated by the investment will be taxed at a rate lower than if
the corporation invested within its own country. Country X corporations
may therefore base investment decisions on tax rate differentials. Doing
so results in inefficient capital allocation and the failure to maximize
worldwide welfare. The territorial taxation system thus prevents capital
export neutrality and causes harm to the global reallocation of wealth.
The policy has a drastically different effect, however, on the
countries' individual national welfares. Because country X taxes
investments made within its borders congruently (regardless of whether
made by country X or country Y corporations), country X corporations
realize after-tax capital returns on domestic investments equal to those of
country Y corporations investing within country X. Similarly, country
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X corporations investing in country Y realize after-tax capital returns
equal to those of country Y corporations also investing within that
country. Country-X corporate residents have income and savings equal
to their country-Y business rivals and therefore are able to compete
internationally. The countries' corporations are free to compete
efficiently on business-oriented, market-based, non-tax, grounds. The
two states' economic welfares have the potential to be equal. Whether
they are is determined by how well the countries' corporations compete.
The states effect capital import neutrality and garner the opportunity to
maximize their individual national welfares.
c. The Realistic System
Neither of the above-mentioned situations exist or could ever occur.
There are far more than just two countries in the world, even if one only
considers the countries U.S. multinationals conduct business within
regularly. Maximization of worldwide economic efficiency (in relation
to taxation), or of U.S. (corporate) income, requires that all nations
partake of a purely 85 worldwide or purely territorial taxation system,
respectively. All states must individually agree, with all other states, to
implement domestically the same worldwide or territorial systems. All
states must create and implement these systems. All states must permit
other states to inspect, comment on, and demand change of, their system.
This is the only way to ensure conformity and to ensure a system
maximizing worldwide economic efficiency or individual domestic
incomes (U.S. domestic income), whichever is its objective. This is
impossible. 86  Each of these economic objectives is therefore
unachievable and unrealistic.87 Analyzing which (if either) of the
situations is more advantageous may have theoretical value, but doing so
85. See Altshuler I, supra note 68, at 4. In fact, no nation has a pure system of any kind. Id.
Territorial systems typically adopt some anti-abuse (anti-deferral) measures, and worldwide systems
may permit some deferral. Id. The author therefore uses "purely" loosely in this context to denote
nations employing systems as worldwide, or as territorial, as possible; these systems are not
compromise systems such as Subpart F.
86. See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, A Tax Competition Primer: Why Tax Harmonization and
Information Exchange Undermine America's Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1460.cfm (July 20, 2001) (last visited 2/23/2005). U.S.
corporations subject to the semi-worldwide, semi-territorial, Subpart F system conduct business, for
example, in and with predominantly territorial European systems. See id Ironically, the OECD,
comprised of the same territorial-taxation-system EU nations as is the WTO, seeks for its nations to
shift to worldwide taxation systems. Id.
87. See Graetz, supra note 75, at 294 (denoting worldwide economic efficiency as unrealistic
and hence of little policy value).
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provides no practical value.
What then, are the effects on domestic competition of the realistic
Subpart F regime? Simply put, the effects are better than those seen in a
globally implemented worldwide system, and less advantageous than
those seen in a globally implemented territorial system. They are better
than those probable in a domestically implemented worldwide system,
and less advantageous than those possible in a domestically
implemented territorial system. This is everything we need to know to
answer our policy question; the Subpart F compromise creates a
competitiveness policy more injurious than would be the territorial,
capital-import-neutrality, policy.
2. Subpart F Not Economically Justified
Is it a bad thing that it is impossible to achieve a purely worldwide,
capital export neutral system? Such a system would eliminate
international tax competition, a form of competition Democrats typically
chastize because of its resulting inefficient allocation of capital
resources. 88 Other than capital allocation, what does the elimination of
competition in this context effect? "[T]ax competition pressures
politicians to be fiscally responsible," in order to preserve low tax rates
and "to attract economic activity (or to keep economic activity from
fleeing to a lower-tax environment). 89 When a government is fiscally
irresponsible with taxpayer dollars, or otherwise fails to serve its
function by acknowledging taxpayer needs and promulgating sound
policy, taxpayers can, in a competitive system, take their business
elsewhere.90  Exporting capital investment to foreign, lower-tax
jurisdictions forces a domestic government to use most efficiently its
monetary resources - taxpayer dollars. If the government abuses its
fiscal power, it will have to cease doing so in order to regain (and to
prevent the addition to) corporate capital invested offshore; it will have
to cut abusive expenditures to lower tax rates. International tax
competition therefore serves as a check on governmental power and
forces more efficient use of taxpayer capital. Similar policy objectives
88. See supra § II.A. 1.and accompanying footnotes (expounding upon the arguments against
international tax competition).
89. Mitchell, supra note 87.
90. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 86 (quoting a practitioner's belief that competitive
pressures will continue to force down corporate tax rates due to the mobility of capital). "Tax rates
in other countries are much lower. It's not a choice. If you don't deal with [it], you get
extinguished." Id. at 88 (quoting Stanley Works Chief Executive Officer John Trani).
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underlie all forms of competition. 91
The maximum-welfare tax system that the political left proposes
would ultimately leave citizens exploited by their governments, and
governments shackled by their membership in a global bureaucracy.
These facts theorize again on a non-existent and impossible globally
implemented system. Similar results may transpire, however, through
implementation of a domestic worldwide taxation system. 92  Without
international tax competition, a government is free to levy taxes at its
will. Because a worldwide taxation system taxes resident income
regardless of its source, a taxpayer has no recourse against a government
abusing its fiscal power. If corporations export their capital, income
they generate will be taxed at the same oppressive rates as if earned at
home.
Given the impossibility of maximizing either worldwide income or
U.S. (corporate) domestic income through a fictitious world, the U.S.
goal should be to maximize its income within the existing world.
Congressional installation of a territorial taxation system would best
serve this goal.94 One need not look beyond the fact that territoriality
maximizes U.S. corporations' international competitiveness 95  and
individual incomes to conclude that the Subpart F regime is not
economically justified. The existence of a better alternative invalidates
continued use of the current compromise system.
Some tax practitioners and economists thus conclude that the
Subpart F compromise system does not serve policy or economic goals.
In fact, it is injurious, they believe, to competitiveness concerns and
causes the inefficient maintenance of corporate capital offshore.96 They
91. See generally id (detailing the benefits of competition to entrepreneurship, economic
growth, and consumer welfare in addition to governmental restraint and economic efficiency).
92. What will occur if the fifteen European Community countries conform to one, worldwide,
taxation system? The abusive governmental practices resultant of a worldwide taxation system are
even less theoretical when viewed in the context of this block of states, than when viewed in the
context of one state.
93. See generally Mitchell, supra note 87.
94. See supra §§ I.B.1., II.B.l.b and accompanying notes (explaining that territorial tax
systems maximize domestic income).
95. See U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21.
96. See, e.g., Ritterpusch, supra note 72, at G-5. United States tax treatment of U.S. nationals
working overseas is so unfavorable that it discourages such practice and has depleted the nation's
presence and market share around the world. See id "It's very difficult to get our share of the
market when we carry around like a backpack of cinder blocks the Internal Revenue Code." Id.
(quoting political economist Daniel Mitchell). These problems "signal[ ) the need for a territorial
tax system." Id.
"U.S. tax laws have become, in essence, penalties that non-U.S. nationals do not have to
work through, thereby giving them more opportunities to build experience working abroad." Id.
20
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 20 [2005], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol20/iss1/1
state further that installation of a territorial system would not merely be
less injurious, but would be more economically efficient and therefore
more policy-sound.97 We must therefore look at these experts as pro-
territorialists. There are, however, pro-worldwideist tax practitioners
who conclude similarly that the Subpart F compromise cannot, and has
not, achieved sound policy objectives.98 Their arguments seem to center,
however, on the premise that the Subpart F system is a failed one solely
because that system cannot achieve capital export neutrality (their
favored policy). The author has found to date no economic studies
mentioned that proffer the economic superiority of a worldwide taxation
system over the Subpart F system.99
Subpart F is not capable of achieving the policy goals behind its
creation. The system fails because there exists an alternative option
(territoriality) demonstrating equal, if not improved, results to that of
Subpart F, but without Subpart F's complications and resource-
intensiveness. The current international tax system thus clearly needs
help. Merely because it proves Subpart F inept, territoriality is not
necessarily the answer. While there is avid support for establishing a
territorial tax system in the U.S., there is just as avid support for
continuance of some form of compromise tax system, be it through
increased regulation or through the retraction of the CTB regime, and
equally avid support for instituting a worldwide taxation system.
III. THE FUTURE: LOOKING TOWARD RETIREMENT - RENOVATION OR
jD-EST - A T rg'T)
A. Renovation through Regulation...
1.... Re-vamp Subpart F
Forty years after Kennedy's proposal, there still exists avid support
"[T]he tax laws make hiring U.S. nationals overseas too expensive for many companies, and should
be replaced with policies that encourage U.S. individuals to work overseas." Id. "The problem is
one of our own making, 'not that we're sending jobs [overseas], it's that we're not exporting our
products to [foreign countries] because we don't have people there selling them."' Ritterpusch,
supra note 72, at G-5.
97. See Chorvat, supra note 21, at 838, 845-56; U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21;
Gleckman, supra note 21, at 88 (stating that today's Subpart F system is so inefficient that a return
to a territorial system may generate $7 billion).
98. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 66, at 25-66.
99. See id. To the contrary, pro-worldwideist tax practitioners acknowledge that no economic
studies may so exist. Id.
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for the establishment in the U.S. of a truly worldwide taxation system.100
Whether through additional regulations supplementing Subpart F or
through a newly created regulatory or legislative regime, the liberal left
seeks to renovate antideferral by completing it. 01 Such advocates view
taxation deferral in the international context as a privilege, as an
exception to the rule of taxation. 0 2  They believe investment decisions
based on tax rates are inefficient decisions, and that international tax
competition injures domestic U.S. corporations. Worldwide system
proponents find it important to remember, in evaluating the Subpart F
compromise, that the regime permits much taxation deferral. They argue
that Subpart F is too weak, is openly avoidable, and permits vast deferral
of taxation on foreign-source income. 1
03
2. ... Scale-down CTB
Many moderate practitioners and politicians, both Republican and
Democrat, advocate alternatively the continuance of a compromise
100. See Fact Sheet on John Kerry's Plan to Create 10 Million Jobs, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 26,
2004 (reprinting the "John Kerry for President" release of Kerry's election platform tax plan that
seeks to tax immediately all corporate income whether earned domestically or internationally). Cf.
Gleckman, supra note 21, at 87 (defining one policy option where "[c]ompanies would pay tax on []
revenues in the year they are earned, rather than when they repatriate the money back to the U.S.[;
i]n return, they would get a tax-rate reduction"). Kerry's tax plan mimics almost word for word the
policy defined in Gleckman's September 9, 2002 Business Week article, except it is unclear
whether Kerry supports taxation of domestic and foreign-source income at equal rates, or whether
he actually intends to make the foreign-source income rate higher. See id. Cf Fact Sheet on John
Kerry's Plan to Create 10 Million Jobs, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 26, 2004. Regardless of any
corporate tax rate change, U.S. levies on its corporations remain in excess of the average for major
industrialized nations. See Howard Gleckman, Is Kerry's Jobs Proposal Jinxed? Rejiggering
foreign taxes is politically savvy, but it won't help unemployment much, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 2004, at
36, 38 (discussing Kerry's international tax reform plan).
101. See generally Fleming, supra note 66; Peroni II, supra note 81.
102. See, e.g., Fact Sheet on John Kerry's Plan to Create 10 Million Jobs, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 26, 2004. Kerry views the current deferral of taxation on non-Subpart F income as a "tax
break". See id.
103. See Peroni I, supra note 65, at 975-76; Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on
International Income: End It, Don 't Mend It-Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart
F? Response to Professor Engel, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1609 (2001) [hereinafter Peroni III] (considering
arguments favoring worldwide taxation compelling and those favoring territorial taxation or
continued compromise weak).
See Mitchell, supra note 87. It is interesting to note that this typically Democratic point of
view mimics what the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) seeks to
do through its proposed global information exchange program. Id. The OECD demands that
member countries impose economic sanctions against nations refusing to share financial and
investment information that would enable the OECD countries to monitor, and thereby tax, their
residents' worldwide income. Id. Implementation of the program would prevent international tax
competition. Id.
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system. 0 4  Regardless of whether they do so because they believe the
Subpart F regime works well, or because they view fruition of either
alternative - a worldwide or a territorial system - as politically
unachievable,'0 5 these proponents support a middle ground. 10 6 Treasury
and the IRS have favored additions to the CTB regulations as a method
of so renovating the existing antideferral regime.'0 7  One such addition
receiving vast support is the Treasury's proposed extraordinary
transaction regulation (ETR).' °8 The ETR scales down the current
applicability of the CTB by revoking the classification of a foreign entity
as disregarded when such designation is made in conjunction with an
extraordinary transaction. 09 The regulation defines the sale, exchange,
transfer, or other disposition of a ten percent or greater interest in a
foreign entity as an extraordinary transaction triggering the classification
revocation."0 The proposed regulation thus prevents tax avoidance in
perhaps the more limited instances where foreign entity reclassification
"materially alters the federal tax consequences" of an extraordinary
transaction."' The ETR prevents circumvention of this rule via a shelf
entity" '2 by also retracting an entity's disregarded classification when
104. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 87-88 (noting many Democrats' fear of anything more
than modest reform, as well as a multinational corporation's council's preference that Congress
"repair[ ] the current system rather than replacing it").
105. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 1, at 1562 ("After years of debate, any triumph of purity
seems doubtful. Neither the political forces in favor of a pure antideferral approach nor the political
forces in favor of a pure territorial approach have the clout for complete victory.").
106. See Engel, supra note 1, at 1563-80 (arguing in favor of retaining a system of
compromise).
107. See, e.g., supra § I.D. (outlining Treasury and the IRS's attempt to regulate international
CTB out of existence).
108. See, e.g, IRS Elves Get Early Start on Reg. Projects, 92 J. TAX'N 4 (2000) (referring to the
reclassification of foreign entities in the face of extraordinary transactions as abusive and
inappropriate); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - Interest Deduction Denial by the Back Door, 90
TAx NOTES 1599, 1602 (2001) (citing as logical the IRS's ability to insert additional transactions
into its definition of an "extraordinary transaction") [hereinafter Sheppard II].
109. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(1)(i), 64 Fed. Reg. 66,591 at 66,592 (Nov. 29,
1999). The extraordinary transaction must occur within a period beginning one day before and
ending 12 months after the date that the foreign entity is reclassified to disregarded status. See Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(l)(i)(A), 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,594. The entity must have enjoyed
corporate status at some point during the 12 months preceding the extraordinary transaction. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(l)(i)(B), 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,594.
110. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(1)(i)(A), 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,592, 66,594.
111. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(3), 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,594 (providing exception
where taxpayer demonstrates that a reclassification otherwise falling within the ETR "does not
materially alter the Federal tax consequences of the extraordinary transaction").
112. See Pillow & Rooney, supra note 33. A shelf entity is a U.S.-owned foreign entity
classified as disregarded for U.S. purposes for longer than twelve months plus one day prior to its
execution of an extraordinary transaction. See id The shelf entity's established disregarded status
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such entity makes an "acquisition transaction" in conjunction with an
extraordinary transaction.' 13
It is instances where the tax consequences of an extraordinary
transaction would be significantly different, if not for the concomitant
change in classification, that Treasury and the IRS tout the ETR as
seeking to curb. As such, the proposed regulation is essentially an anti-
abuse measure. Applicable where a corporation exercises an entity
reclassification blatantly with the sole purpose of avoiding the taxation
of a large deal, the merits of the anti-abuse rule are virtually
unchallengeable. Whether or not the ETR is indeed more limited in
scope than its predecessor conversion regulations, however, is reliant
upon what transactions the ETR deems "extraordinary" for the
regulation's application. 1 4 While the ETR proposal provides examples,
it does not limit itself in application to situations mimicking these
examples. In fact, Treasury and the IRS expressly leave open for
themselves 15 the opportunity to add transactions to the extraordinary
transaction definition as they see fit. However, because Treasury and
the IRS promulgated the ETR in response to the moratorium Congress
placed on the conversion regulations, some practitioners and politicians
fear the government seeks still full conversion of the CTB's international
tax effects.
B. Restoration through Revocation...
1.... Put a Stop Order on Check-the-Box
Implementing the previously discussed proposed conversion
regulations would restore the pre-CTB Subpart F regime by effectively
revoking the application of CTB internationally.1 6 Doing so remains a
is used in an attempt to circumvent the ETR's twelve-month stay on extraordinary transactions. See
id. at 204-06.
113. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(h)(2)(i), 64 Fed. Reg. 66,591, 66,594 (Nov. 29, 1999).
114. See generally Pillow & Rooney, supra note 33 (calling into question the vagueness of the
extraordinary transaction definition). The regulations do not define, for example, what constitutes
an "interest" for purposes of the ten percent threshold. Id. at 206. Whether attribution rules apply
or whether only directly owned shares of stock are to be considered is not discussed. Id.
Furthermore, whether stock is the only subject of concern or whether other rights bear the "interest"
designation is not defined. Id. Additionally, what is an "other disposition" is left open for
interpretation. Id. For example, one knows not whether a liquidating distribution would fall within
the provision. Id.
115. See Birnkrant & Croker, supra note 16, at 51-53 (analyzing administrative versus
Congressional authority).
116. See supra § I.D.
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viable goal; the IRS asserts its intention to see the conversion regulations
effected, and many tax scholars advocate restoration of Subpart F.
117
Alternatively, some compromise advocates seek direct revocation of the
CTB internationally through amendment of the CTB regulations.
Removing the international portion of the CTB regulations from the
books would effect the same goal as effecting the conversion
regulations, but with less paperwork and greater ease to both the
government and taxpayers.
2.... Rescind Cross Border Tax, Subpart F
Forty years after fierce opposition to the Kennedy proposal forced
compromise, proponents of a U.S. territorial tax system retain a loud
voice. 18  In fact, in light of recent events," 9 the conservative political
right had, for a time, great momentum to revoke the Subpart F regime
entirely and restore the U.S. to territoriality. 120  The right views taxation
deferral in the international context as the rule, and Subpart F's
antideferral provisions as its exception. 12 Even if Subpart F does not
affect capital repatriation directly, support for the regime's revocation
117. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 1, at 1603-06 (proffering several alternative systems, all
geared at continued compromise).
118. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 87 (noting House Ways & Means Committee Chairman
Bill Thomas as wanting to "scrap the whole mess" because it is "out of sync with the rest of the
world"); Ritterpusch, supra note 72, at G-5 (highlighting Veronique de Rugy as advocating a
territorial tax system as an "incremental step[ ]" to fundamental tax reform). See also Nancy
Ognanovich, Cheney Attacks Kerry 's Proposals to Cut Corporate Tax Rates and Alter Subpart F,
DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 30, 2004, at G-8 ("The way to add jobs in this economy is to win the
competition for world markets, and to sell more goods that say 'Made in America"' (quoting Vice-
President Dick Cheney)); Martin Crutsinger, Bush Avows Free Trade Despite Dem Attacks, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 9, 2004 (speaking to President Bush's proponents of "tearing down barriers to U.S.
exports").
While Democrats, John Kerry specifically, admonish the Bush Administration for the U.S.'s
nearly $500 billion trade deficit, see Crutsinger, supra, some political economists blame the U.S.
international taxation system for "the ballooning trade deficit," see Ritterpusch, supra note 72, at G-
5. Such economists call for a territorial taxation system to relieve the export deficit. See id. If the
economics of such conclusions are correct, the 'economic isolationist,"' nature of Kerry's
worldwide taxation platform would further obliterate U.S. exportation. See Crutsinger, supra
(quoting President Bush).
119. See infra § III.C.
120. The more immediate concerns of the war on terror, U.S. operations in Iraq, the
presidential election, and existing tax cuts that were slated to expire at the end of 2004 tabled the
conservatives' focus on massively overhauling the international tax regime and pushing for
restoring territorialism to U.S. income taxation. Nonetheless, legislation calling for the repeal of
portions of the international tax code and Subpart F particularly has been promulgated continually.
See, e.g., Fairness, Simplification and Competitiveness for American Business Act, H.R. 285, 108th
Cong. (2003).
121. See Rosenbloom, supra note 18, at 156-63 (2000).
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exists nonetheless in the fact that it provides no greater economic benefit
than does its non-existence. 122 Given that its eradication would cause no
injury, lawmakers need no additional reason to cease maintenance and
enforcement of the intricate, resource-intensive Subpart F regime. An
additional positive benefit exists nonetheless. The U.S. government and
its taxpayers would ultimately recognize greater income, from savings
on Subpart F maintenance and compliance expenditures, if lawmakers
revoke the regime.
23
C. Attainability - Is it Too Soon to Retire, Or is the Time Right?
The current political make-up of Congress does not permit
establishment of a worldwide, greater anti-deferral taxation system.
Continued compromise is always the most likely outcome. Even if done
through extensive, long-term, hotly-contested debate, in the end some
form of compromise system is still the easiest to enact. 124  However,
three sets of events timely cause the establishment of a territorial tax
system to be a realistic possibility. First, vast implementation of the
CTB regime to circumvent Subpart F, as discussed previously, has
sparked many to reconsider the usefulness of Subpart F and whether
lawmakers should not simply revoke the regime.
1. U.S. Corporate Icons Inverting Into non-U.S. Corporations
Second, many large, well-known, U.S. corporations have, in recent
years, reincorporated as non-U.S. corporations in avoidance of the
Subpart F regime) 25 Reincorporating under Bermuda law, for example,
122. Seesupra § II.
123. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 89 (quoting two economists as saying that the U.S.
international tax regime "is so inefficient... that exempting overseas income from taxes would
actually generate $7 billion more for the Treasury than the current regime, which is supposed to be
taxing it"). Corporations and tax practitioners have, without a doubt, masterminded numerous
means by which to circumvent Subpart F. See generally id. However, any tax savings generated by
such acts cost business - not only in exorbitant accountant and tax attorney fees, but in lost
entrepreneurial opportunities and sound business judgment - as time and focus are shifted from the
business of doing business to the art of cutting taxes. See id. at 88. See also, e.g., Chorvat, supra
note 21, at 836 (calling on the U.S. to adopt a territorial, or exemption, system with retention of
certain anti-abuse rules).
124. See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 86, 89 (pondering whether Congress will merely band-
aid the crisis with corporate tax cuts or initiate true reform and concluding it will go the route of the
modest fix).
125. See Glen Johnson, Congress Looks to Plug Tax Loophole - Bill Targets Advantages
Sought by U.S. Firms that Incorporate Offshore, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2002, at Dl (3d ed.);
David Cay Johnston, U.S. Corporations Are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2002, at A l; Susan Pulliam, Reincorporating Companies Find Bermuda a Place to Shed Some
26
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subjects a (formerly U.S.) corporation to the domestic taxation laws of
Bermuda. What were foreign corporate operations in Bermuda thus
become domestic operations, and what were domestic corporate
operations in the U.S. invert to foreign operations. Because Bermuda
implements a territorial taxation system, the U.S. operations are thus
subject only to taxation by the U.S. as a foreign taxing jurisdiction;
Bermuda does not also tax the foreign-source income. By inverting, the
corporation thus eliminates application of, and the hassles of dealing
with, dual taxation and the Subpart F regime with all its rules,
exceptions, credits, and exceptions to exceptions. Additionally, the
corporation enjoys a lower (or no) domestic income tax rate in its new
home country than it paid in the U.S.
12 6
U.S. icon corporations state as their reason for reincorporation the
oppressive nature of Subpart F, and the U.S. semi-worldwide taxation
system in general. 127  Regardless of whether this is the sole reason for
the recent inversions, two things are clear. First, only renovation of the
U.S. international taxation system is likely to provide a long-term
incentive for these corporations to return to the U.S. or to prevent further
inversions.128  Second, the type of renovation the corporations demand,
of Those Extra Taxes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002, at C4. Tyco International, Ingersoll-Rand, and
Accenture have all re-incorporated in foreign nations. See Gleckman, supra note 2 1, at 86-89.
See also Tim McLaughlin, Tyco Shareholders Approve Bermuda, PwC, REUTERS, Mar. 7,
2003 (reporting the company's shareholder vote to remain incorporated in Bermuda). Pro-tax
liberal Democrats have coined the heads of inverting corporations, "'Benedict Arnold CEOs.' See
Gleckman, supra note 101, at 36 (quoting John Kerry).
126. See Johnson, supra note 126, at DI; Johnston, supra note 126, at Al; Pulliam, supra note
126, at C4. Inversions have occurred recently predominantly because of the weakened economy.
See Johnston, supra. Stock prices have dropped significantly for many multinationals, resulting in
the realization of little or no capital gains to shareholders upon the sale of such stock. See id.
Invoking a § 367 constructive stock sale through inverting does not, therefore, currently serve as a
barrier to inversion for many corporations. See id In fact, some multinational shareholders have
benefited from their corporations' inversions through the recognition of resultant stock sale losses.
See id This turn of events is ironic because President Bush and Republicans in general have had as
a driving force behind their political strategies and policy proposals, since even before the waging
of war against the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001, the strengthening of the U.S. economy. Incidentally, that
the U.S. economy has continued to strengthen seems a fairly accepted belief since Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan recently spoke to Congressional committees on the issue.
127. See Ritterpusch, supra note 72, at G-5 (citing U.S. tax policy as the cause of companies'
essential renouncement of their U.S. citizenship). "[W]orldwide taxation is a burden that is driving
American companies to other nations." U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21.
128. See generally Gleckman, supra note 101 (summarizing economists' and multinational
CEOs' sentiments that a territorial system is required to remedy inversions). But see Curt
Anderson, Democrats Take on Tax Havens Issue, ASSOC. PRESS, Jul. 31, 2002 (defining other
means by which to prevent inversions); Allan Sloan, Is Moving Offshore Going Too Far?,
WASHINGTON POST, May 28, 2002, at El (admonishing PricewaterhouseCoopers for its plans to
invert its consulting arm). Stanley Works, another U.S. corporate icon, caved to a public outlash
2005] SUBPART F
27
Ram Sweitzer: Anaylyzing Subpart F in Light of Check-the-Box
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
and for which the inversions open the door, is the restoration of a
territorial system. 1
29
against its inverting overseas, despite having already finalized the decision for economic, business
reasons. See Masha Herbst, Stanley Approves Tax Move to Bermuda, WASHINGTON POST, May 10,
2002, at E3 (noting the business reasons behind Stanley Works' decision to invert); Gleckman,
supra note 101 (explaining Stanley Works' decision not to invert).
Whether it is because they are moderates advocating reparation of the current system, or
conservatives trying to gain any headway at a time when they will not win on drastic reform, House
and Senate Republicans continue to legislate changes to the existing system. See, e.g., American
Jobs Creation Act, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004); Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S.
1637, 108th Cong. (2004). Democrats have won a key measure in the Senate form of the ETI repeal
bill. See S. 1637. This legislation would cause inverting corporations to recognize tax on stock
options in the inversion process, curbing what is currently a major appeal of inversions. See Kurt
Ritterpusch, Export Tax Repeal Bill Would Strip Benefits of Inverting Firms' Deferral of Stock
Gains, DAILY TAX REP., May 12, 2004.
Even treaty negotiations, arguably Republican right now, demonstrate some similar
maneuvers to penalize inverted corporations; a recent U.S-Barbados treaty protocol was executed
specifically so that a corporation will now be eligible for U.S.-Barbados treaty benefits only if its
principal class of stock is listed and traded in the corporation's state of incorporation. See Alison
Bennett, United States, Barbados Sign Tax Protocol Aimed at Shutting Down Treaty Abuses, DAILY
TAX REP., Jul. 15, 2004. This precludes inverted U.S. corporations, which are incorporated in
Barbados but trade on U.S. stock markets, from reaping whatever treaty benefits they relied upon in
making the economic choice to invert. See id.
John Kerry believes that instituting a worldwide taxation system will cause U.S corporations to
return home or never leave; presumably, Kerry discerns that because such a system taxes income at
the same rates regardless of whether it is earned within or without U.S. borders, such a system will
remove all motivation to invest abroad rather than domestically. See Gleckman, supra note 101, at
36, 38 (stating Kerry's plan and noting that economists see no change in unemployment resulting
from it). One of the critical points Kerry's reliance on the Kennedy-era plan ignores is the
overwhelming mass of U.S. business investment that already exists overseas. At the time of the
Kennedy Administration's plan, foreign trade, albeit booming after the release of isolationism and
the promotion of economic freedom resulting from World War II, it was still miniscule at best in
comparison to the depth to which American commerce pervades the globe today. While Kerry's
plan seeks specifically to "punish[ ] others that are scrambling to compete overseas," see Gleckman,
supra note 101, at 36, it will also cause "a cash-flow nightmare for businesses" already operating
overseas, see Gleckman, supra note 21, at 89.
See Gleckman, supra note 21, at 86 ("If nothing else, there is broad agreement that the
system needs fixing."). "In the end, Washington is going to have to find a way to modernize its tax
code. Or else it can expect to see more and more U.S. companies shipping out." Id. at 87.
129. See Johnston, supra note 126, at Al (noting statements that U.S. tax laws discriminate
against U.S.-based multinational corporations and that the inversions to Bermuda should prompt
Congressional change); Pulliam, supra note 126, at C4 (quoting Treasury assistant secretary for tax
policy, Mark Weinberger, as suggesting that antiquated U.S. international tax laws are driving
corporations to invert); Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination of Tax-Driven
Expatriation by United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 VA. TAX REV. 75, 79 (2000)
(stating that the problem of inversions "invites radical solutions" by Congress).
Westin states, in 2000, that (citizen) tax-motivated inversions will increase in popularity due
to the strength of the U.S. economy. See id. It is interesting to note that current (corporate)
inversions are occurring precisely because of the U.S. economic downturn. See Pulliam, supra, at
C4.
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2. WTO's Ruling that U.S. Domestic Tax Policy Violates GATT
A third timely event opening the congressional door for revocation
is the WTO's ruling that the U.S.'s tax treatment of corporate export
income constitutes an unfair trade subsidy in violation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 30  The World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have attacked the
U.S.'s sovereign right to enact and maintain its own taxation system,
imposing sanctions against the U.S. ostensibly for being unique.1 31 The
U.S. risks being forced to harmonize its taxation rates and system with
those of the EU social welfare states due to its membership in the GATT
and the WTO. 132 Conceding any sovereign rights to formulate domestic
economic policy is dangerous and grossly unpatriotic. Compromising
American competitiveness - especially to cohere to historically failed
European ways of economizing - is treasonous. Transforming the U.S.
back to a system of solely territorial taxation would "be fitting
revenge."1
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The existence of the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (ETI) regimes evidences
lawmakers' recognition that the U.S. semi-worldwide taxation system is
injurious to U.S. multinational competitiveness, and that such
competitiveness is crucial to the U.S. economy. Primarily, the fact that
Congress created the FSC regime, and replaced it with the ETI regime
upon FSC's forced demise, demonstrates a clear belief that relief from
semi-worldwide taxation is necessary to U.S. exporting corporations.
Additionally, the fact that lawmakers do not even consider as a viable
option-in light of the WTO's denouncement of the ETI regime-the
application of U.S. tax law without some FSC or ETI-like provisions,
demonstrates further the belief that the U.S. international tax laws are
130. See Taxes- Thomas, Rangel Urge Administration to Lead on FSC, CONGRESSDAILY,
Feb. 27, 2002 (defining the WTO ruling as a possible "launching point" for comprehensive tax
reform); U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21. While the U.S. would be chagrinned to change its
taxation system in response to the WTO ruling, see Trade, Deputy Treasury Secretary Argues WTO
Case on FSCs, CONGRESSDAILY/A.M., Nov. 28, 2001 (suggesting the WTO ruling disrespects U.S.
sovereignty because it will force the U.S. into reforming its tax system), the ruling does provide
additional support to those already pushing for revocation of the semi-worldwide system. See US.
Should Respond, supra ("[T]he WTO has given U.S. policy makers a reason to junk worldwide
taxation of corporate income and instead implement a territorial tax system.").
131. See Doug Palmer & Patrick Lannin, E. U. Hits U.S. Goods with Sanctions, REUTERS, Mar.
1,2004.
132. U.S. Should Respond, supra note 21.
133. Id. Territoriality would be "fitting revenge" on the OECD and the EU because restoring a
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harmful to U.S. corporations. Lawmakers angered by the WTO ruling
advocate the complete overhaul of the U.S. international taxation system
before they even consider unbuffered application of the U.S. laws, as
they now exist. Ironically, it appeared for some time that the blow from
the WTO had opened up a door to pro-territorialists; because the
Congress needs not merely to revoke the ETI provisions, but to
promulgate a new (and somehow GATT-friendly) export-promoting
system in its place, the time was ripe for strong advocation of scrapping
the international taxation system altogether and starting anew.
Unfortunately, in light of the recent congressional bills that appear close
to concluding the ETI issue, it appears that the opportunity has been lost
to be fought another day.
134
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolution of Subpart F has come full circle; in light of current
inversions of major U.S. multinationals into non-U.S. multinationals,
specifically to avoid the complications of Subpart F, and the reduction of
the U.S. tax base that necessarily corresponds, Subpart F undeniably
results in some erosion of the U.S. tax base. Its purpose for existing is
thus nullified and it is time for the U.S to return to a policy of territorial
taxation.
The recent inversions are both the impetus and the support
Congressional Republicans need to take action. Congress has had
essentially no reason to act until now. Republicans have had no reason
to stir-up trouble because Treasury and the IRS pushed back the
effective date of regulations that would neutralize the CTB regime.
Democrats have not had the political or business sector support required
to justify attempts to push forward their cause for deferral - the Subpart
F compromise is the best they could do. Some argue that "[n]either the
political forces in favor of a pure antideferral approach nor the political
forces in favor of a pure territorial approach have the clout for complete
victory. ' ,135 If this is true, then neither the relative strength nor the
economic truth behind either extreme policy perspective is of
consequence - for neither is potentially executable.
But is it true that neither end of the spectrum has enough clout to
enact a system vastly different from Subpart F? Clearly, this was the
fact in 1962. But over forty years later, the world has changed.
134. See H.R. 4520, supra note 129; S. 1637, supra note 129; Ritterpusch, supra note 72, at G-
5.
135. Engel, supra note 1, at 1562.
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Treasury and the IRS themselves accept the possibility that the evolution
of the global economy may have modified the effectiveness of Subpart
F. Facts are that U.S. multinationals are inverting continually, and it is
the Democrats who are arguing for government action in response;
Democrats are complaining that President Bush should be somehow
counteracting inversion. 136 This situation provides Republicans greater
ability to create real international tax law change - to repeal Subpart F
and semi-worldwide taxation. Although there is a congressional
political party split, the recent inversions counteract the Democrats'
argument for antideferral. After all, if corporations are inverting even
when they have the CTB "anti-Subpart F" regulations at their disposal,
how can one accept that corporations will be less likely to invert with
even partial antideferral (Subpart F without CTB), let alone with
complete antideferral (revocation of Subpart F and its replacement with
a complete antideferral system)? Perhaps ironically, Republicans lose
the strength of this argument as the U.S. economy strengthens. The
incentive thus exists for congressional Republicans to act now.
Even if a territorial system favors foreign investment and depletes
the potential tax base, the end-all question is, does it reduce actual tax
dollars collected? Economic studies say "no." And if they are not
convincing enough, just look at the facts. Tyco and Ingersoll-Rand have
depleted their actual U.S. taxes paid by thirty and forty million dollars,
per year, respectively, by inverting to Bermuda. Stanley Works would
have depleted its actual U.S. taxes paid by thirty million dollars, per
year, if it had inverted. The territorial system would prevent these and
other U.S. multinationals, icons and newbies alike, from fleeing their
U.S. home. It would take away the incentive, if not the need, to abandon
the U.S. The IRS estimates that it currently loses seventy billion dollars
per year in potential tax revenues through inversions that have already
taken place. Additionally, the retention of vast amounts of capital
offshore, resultant of Subpart F, necessarily has caused a depletion in the
potential U.S. tax base. This is true not because, absent Subpart F,
multinationals would repatriate their foreign-source income, subjecting it
to U.S. taxation. It is true because, absent Subpart F, a territorial system
favoring repatriation of capital back into the U.S. becomes a real
possibility. Policy papers ignore the potentiality of increased domestic
tax revenues generated by corporate reinvestment. The U.S. government
136. See Johnston, supra note 126, at A1; Pulliam, supra note 126, at C4. But see Engel, supra
note 1, at 1570; Treasury Releases Fact Sheet on Subpart F Study, 2001 TAX NOTES 1-15 (2001)
(regarding lack of concern for whether U.S. multinationals expatriate as a Democratic viewpoint).
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will necessarily lose tax dollars currently reaped through Subpart F
antideferral if the regime is revoked. The author proffers that this sum is
miniscule in comparison to the sum of tax dollars that business-minded,
real American ingenuity will generate as a result of the freeing-up of
resources currently sucked-up by attention to tax law issues. The sum is
obliterated if territoriality sparks even nominally the reinvestment of
U.S. corporate capital repatriated to the U.S. The tax results of
implementing territoriality in taxation cannot be worse than Subpart F.
Whether we expend valuable time and capital to negotiate around
Subpart F, or whether we simply do not have Subpart F, the tax dollars
that the U.S. recognizes are at least equivalent.
This territorial system must, however, somehow encourage the
repatriation of capital back into the U.S. in addition to favoring the
domestic maintenance of corporate parents. Because the only partial
antideferral nature of the Subpart F regime encourages international tax
competition to some point, it causes capital to be trapped outside the
U.S. The better approach is to encourage the most efficient allocation of
capital resources, through establishing a territorial system allowing free
international tax competition, but to couple the system with an ability to
repatriate profits to the U.S. for corporate reinvestment. Proposed
methods for encouraging repatriation are: (1) provision of a tax rate
reduction, (2) provision of tax deferral on income repatriated for
designated uses, (3) provision of a tax exemption for repatriated capital
invested in designated forms, and (4) provision of a tax exemption for all
repatriated capital. What the author proposes is therefore not a pure
territorial taxation system, given that such a system taxes all income
upon receipt within the U.S. The author's system would rather tax
income as earned within the U.S. Some form of repatriation tax
alleviation system, as described above but beyond the scope of this
article, would render the author's system modified-territorial.
On its face, the Subpart F compromise seems fair, if not ideal.
Penalize for reducing the U.S. tax base and depleting domestic
reinvestment in those capital exports that have no purpose other than to
avoid U.S. taxation. Permit to compete on equal grounding in the global
economy and improve the U.S. trade deficit those capital exports
invested to compete commercially and generate profits for U.S. parents.
Perhaps the Subpart F compromise is ideal politically or philosophically
- but is it not beneficial economically. Subpart F is tax law, and
ultimately tax law (supposedly) concerns the efficient and fair collection
and maintenance of tax dollars. The more efficient, more competitive
(and therefore fair), and less administratively overbearing means of
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collecting U.S. multinational dollars is through establishing a territorial
taxation system. The first step necessary to accomplishing this goal is
Congressional repeal of Subpart F.
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